Colombia’s Post-Forero Trajectory: Three Scenarios to 2030

Strategic Foresight

The killing of Hernando Forero Mosquera initiates a critical juncture for Colombia's peace process and state consolidation.

The starting conditions

The reported killing of Hernando Forero Mosquera, an alleged rebel leader, just days into a new presidential term in Colombia, serves as a sharp opening gambit in the administration's declared intent to confront armed groups. This event is not merely an isolated security operation; it refracts the complex, multi-layered challenges confronting the Colombian state, particularly its ambition to extend territorial control and consolidate peace. The previous administration's peace accord with the FARC fundamentally altered the landscape, yet numerous dissident factions, criminal organisations, and other armed actors continued to operate, often exploiting illicit economies such as coca cultivation, illegal mining, and extortion.

The incoming government inherits a nation still grappling with the uneven implementation of the 2016 accord, persistent rural insecurity, and the deep-seated grievances that fuel recruitment into armed groups. The strategic significance of Forero Mosquera's alleged demise lies not in the removal of a single individual, but in how this act signals the new government's operational resolve. The ensuing period will test the administration's capacity to balance military pressure with political outreach, and its ability to distinguish between genuinely reintegration-seeking actors and those primarily driven by criminal enterprise. The immediate aftermath of this operation therefore sets a critical tone for the administration’s security doctrine and its broader vision for 'total peace'.

Scenario one: State consolidation and gradual pacification

Under this scenario, Colombia by 2030 could exhibit significant progress towards state consolidation and a measurable reduction in the operational capacity of armed groups. The initial assertive security posture, exemplified by the Forero Mosquera operation, might be sustained and strategically applied, targeting command structures and logistical networks while simultaneously opening avenues for demobilisation and reintegration for lower-ranking combatants. This approach would necessitate a highly coordinated effort between military and civilian agencies, focusing on robust state presence in historically neglected rural areas, coupled with investments in infrastructure, alternative livelihoods, and justice mechanisms.

The success of this scenario would depend on the government's ability to fragment the remaining armed groups, exploiting internal divisions and reducing their access to funding streams from illicit economies. International support, particularly for rural development and anti-narcotics efforts, would likely be a critical enabler. Should this path materialise, Colombia could project a more stable image, attracting increased foreign investment and strengthening democratic institutions, albeit with lingering pockets of localised conflict. The national military would likely shift its focus towards territorial control and interdiction rather than large-scale counter-insurgency operations.

Scenario two: Persistent fragmentation and localised conflict

An alternative trajectory suggests that by 2030, Colombia could remain mired in a state of persistent fragmentation, characterised by numerous localised conflicts and a protracted struggle for territorial control. In this scenario, the initial military pressure might disrupt some armed groups, but fail to dismantle their underlying structures or address the socio-economic conditions that perpetuate their existence. New groups might emerge or existing ones adapt, leading to a 'whack-a-mole' dynamic where state gains in one area are offset by losses in another.

This scenario posits that the government's 'total peace' strategy could struggle to achieve coherence, perhaps due to internal political divisions, resource constraints, or an inability to effectively negotiate with diverse, often purely criminal, actors. Illicit economies would likely continue to thrive, providing a consistent revenue stream for armed groups and complicating efforts to establish alternative economic models. The result would be a nation where security gains are episodic and fragile, where large swaths of rural territory remain contested, and where the state's writ is unevenly applied. International perception of Colombia under this scenario would likely remain cautious, impacting investment and development aid flows.

Scenario three: Resurgence of large-scale conflict

A more pessimistic but plausible scenario for Colombia by 2030 involves a resurgence of large-scale conflict, potentially reaching levels reminiscent of pre-2016 intensity. This outcome could materialise if the current administration's security strategy is perceived as either too aggressive without corresponding political solutions, or too lenient, allowing armed groups to regroup and consolidate. A critical miscalculation in negotiations, or a significant breakdown in trust between the state and armed actors, could precipitate a broader return to hostilities.

Factors contributing to this scenario might include a pronounced economic downturn exacerbating social grievances, a significant increase in the profitability of illicit economies, or external geopolitical shifts that reduce international engagement or provide new avenues for armed groups to acquire resources. Should a major armed group successfully unify disparate factions under a common banner, or if the state's military capacity is overstretched, the conflict could escalate beyond localised skirmishes. This would entail substantial humanitarian costs, significant internal displacement, and a severe blow to Colombia's international standing and economic prospects, potentially destabilising the wider Andean region.

Wildcards that would break every scenario

Several high-impact, low-probability events could fundamentally alter any of these projected scenarios. A sudden, drastic shift in global demand for illicit narcotics, perhaps due to widespread legalisation or new public health approaches, could collapse a primary funding mechanism for armed groups, forcing a rapid re-evaluation of their operational models. Conversely, a significant increase in the global price of key commodities, such as gold, could supercharge illegal mining operations, providing unprecedented resources to armed actors and making state control even more elusive.

Climate change also presents a formidable wildcard. Extreme weather events, widespread crop failures, or significant shifts in arable land could trigger mass internal migration, exacerbating existing social tensions and creating new pools of vulnerable individuals susceptible to recruitment. Furthermore, a major regional geopolitical crisis, diverting international attention and resources away from Colombia, could leave the nation to grapple with its internal conflicts with diminished external support, potentially accelerating a negative trajectory irrespective of domestic policy choices.

Strategic implications

The trajectory Colombia takes by 2030 carries profound strategic implications, extending beyond its borders. For international anti-narcotics efforts, the outcome will determine whether the focus shifts towards demand reduction or remains predominantly supply-side interdiction. Regional stability in the Andean corridor will largely hinge on Colombia's success or failure in consolidating peace, impacting migration patterns, cross-border crime, and diplomatic relations with neighbouring states. For institutional investors, the level of perceived risk will dictate capital flows, particularly into extractive industries and infrastructure projects. The choice of strategy by the current administration, and its execution in the aftermath of events such as the Forero Mosquera operation, will therefore not only define Colombia's domestic future but also recalibrate a range of international policy frameworks. What, then, is the ultimate measure of 'total peace' if the means to achieve it are continually contested?

Scenario matrix

Probabilities are estimates, not certainties. They are published so the forecast can be scored later.

Source material: BBC News